By George Friedman
It
has now been four years since the fall of Baghdad concluded the U.S.
invasion of Iraq. We have said much about the Iraq war, and for the
moment there is little left to say. The question is whether the
United States will withdraw forces from Iraq or whether it will be
able to craft some sort of political resolution to the war, both
within Iraq and in the region. Military victory, in the sense of the
unfettered imposition of U.S. will in Iraq, does not appear to us a
possibility. Therefore, over the next few months, against the
background of the U.S. offensive in Baghdad, the political equation
will play out. The action continues. The analysis must pause and
await results.
During this pause, we have been thinking about
some of the broader questions involved in Iraq -- and about the
nature and limits of American military power in particular. We
recently considered the purpose of U.S. wars since World War II in
our discussion of U.S. warfare as strategic
spoiling attack. Now we turn to another dimension of U.S.
military power -- the U.S. Navy -- and consider what role, if any,
it plays in national security at this point.
Recent events
have directed our attention to the role and limits of naval power.
During the detention
of the 15 British sailors and marines, an idea floated by many
people was that the United States should impose a blockade against
Iran. The argument was driven partly by a lack of other options:
Neither an invasion nor an extended air campaign seemed a viable
alternative. Moreover, the United States' experience in erecting
blockades is rich with decisive examples: the Cuban missile crisis,
barring Germany's ability to trade during World War II or that of
the American South during the Civil War. The one unquestionable
military asset the United States has is its Navy, which can impose
sea-lane control anywhere in the world. Finally, Iran -- which is
rich in oil (all of which is exported by sea) but lacks sufficient
refinery capacity of its own -- relies on imported gasoline.
Therefore, the argument went, imposing a naval blockade would
cripple Iran's economy and bring the leadership to the negotiating
table.
Washington never seriously considered the option. This
was partly because of diplomatic discussions that indicated that the
British detainees would be released under any circumstances. And it
was partly because of the difficulties involved in blockading Iran
at this time:
1. Iran could mount strategic counters to a
blockade, either by increasing anti-U.S. operations by its Shiite
allies in Iraq or by inciting Shiite communities in the Arabian
Peninsula to unrest. The United States didn't have appetite for the
risk.
2. Blockades always involve the interdiction of vessels
operated by third countries -- countries that might not appreciate
being interdicted. The potential repercussions of interdicting
merchant vessels belonging to powers that did not accept the
blockade was a price the United States would not pay at this
time.
A blockade was not selected because it was not needed,
because Iran could retaliate in other ways and because a blockade
might damage countries other than Iran that the United States didn't
want to damage. It was, therefore, not in the cards. Not imposing a
blockade made sense.
The
Value of Naval Power
This
raises a more fundamental question: What is the value of naval power
in a world in which naval battles are not fought? To frame the
question more clearly, let us begin by noting that the United States
has maintained global maritime hegemony since the end of World War
II. Except for the failed Soviet attempt to partially challenge the
United States, the most important geopolitical fact since World War
II was that the world's oceans were effectively under the control of
the U.S. Navy. Prior to World War II, there were multiple contenders
for maritime power, such as Britain, Japan and most major powers. No
one power, not even Britain, had global maritime hegemony. The
United States now does. The question is whether this hegemony has
any real value at this time -- a question made relevant by the issue
of whether to blockade Iran.
The United States controls the
blue water. To be a little more precise, the U.S. Navy can assert
direct and overwhelming control over any portion of the blue water
it wishes, and it can do so in multiple places. It cannot directly
control all of the oceans at the same time. However, the total
available naval force that can be deployed by non-U.S. powers
(friendly and other) is so limited that they lack the ability, even
taken together, to assert control anywhere should the United States
challenge their presence. This is an unprecedented situation
historically.
The current situation is, of course,
invaluable to the United States. It means that a seaborne invasion
of the United States by any power is completely impractical. Given
the geopolitical condition of the United States, the homeland is
secure from conventional military attack but vulnerable to terrorist
strikes and nuclear attacks. At the same time, the United States is
in a position to project forces at will to any part of the globe.
Such power projection might not be wise at times, but even failure
does not lead to reciprocation. For instance, no matter how badly
U.S. forces fare in Iraq, the Iraqis will not invade the United
States if the Americans are defeated there.
This is not a
trivial fact. Control of the seas means that military or political
failure in Eurasia will not result in a direct conventional threat
to the United States. Nor does such failure necessarily preclude
future U.S. intervention in that region. It also means that no other
state can choose to invade the United States. Control of the seas
allows the United States to intervene where it wants, survive the
consequences of failure and be immune to occupation itself. It was
the most important geopolitical consequence of World War II, and one
that still defines the world.
The issue for the United States
is not whether it should abandon control of the seas -- that would
be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has
to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers
either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have
fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their
efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses
aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program
under way that could challenge the United States for several
generations.
One argument, then, is that the United States
should cut its naval forces radically -- since they have, in effect,
done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free
up resources for other military requirements without threatening
U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt
to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time
involved in naval construction is such that the United States would
have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building
new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge.
The
counterargument normally given is that the U.S. Navy provides a
critical service in what is called littoral warfare. In other words,
while the Navy might not be needed immediately to control sea-lanes,
it carries out critical functions in securing access to those lanes
and projecting rapid power into countries where the United States
might want to intervene. Thus, U.S. aircraft carriers can bring
tactical airpower to bear relatively quickly in any intervention.
Moreover, the Navy's amphibious capabilities -- particularly those
of deploying and supplying the U.S. Marines -- make for a rapid
deployment force that, when coupled with Naval airpower, can secure
hostile areas of interest for the United States.
That
argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides
a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it
cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the
Army must be brought in to occupy territory -- or, as in Iraq, the
Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve
essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening
move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer
conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the
opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation.
If one accepts this argument, the case for a Navy of the
current size and shape is not proven. How many carrier battle groups
are needed and, given the threat to the carriers, is an entire
battle group needed to protect them?
If we consider the Iraq
war in isolation, for example, it is apparent that the Navy served a
function in the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces. It is not
clear, however, that the Navy has served an important role in the
attempt to occupy and pacify Iraq. And, as we have seen in the case
of Iran, a blockade is such a complex politico-military matter that
the option not to blockade tends to emerge as the obvious
choice.
The
Risk Not Taken
The
argument for slashing the Navy can be tempting. But consider the
counterargument. First, and most important, we must consider the
crises the United States has not experienced. The presence of the
U.S. Navy has shaped the ambitions of primary and secondary powers.
The threshold for challenging the Navy has been so high that few
have even initiated serious challenges. Those that might be trying
to do so, like the Chinese, understand that it requires a
substantial diversion of resources. Therefore, the mere existence of
U.S. naval power has been effective in averting crises that likely
would have occurred otherwise. Reducing the power of the U.S. Navy,
or fine-tuning it, would not only open the door to challenges but
also eliminate a useful, if not essential, element in U.S. strategy
-- the ability to bring relatively rapid force to bear.
There
are times when the Navy's use is tactical, and times when it is
strategic. At this moment in U.S. history, the role of naval power
is highly strategic. The domination of the world's oceans represents
the foundation stone of U.S. grand strategy. It allows the United
States to take risks while minimizing consequences. It facilitates
risk-taking. Above all, it eliminates the threat of sustained
conventional attack against the homeland. U.S. grand strategy has
worked so well that this risk appears to be a phantom. The dispersal
of U.S. forces around the world attests to what naval power can
achieve. It is illusory to believe that this situation cannot be
reversed, but it is ultimately a generational threat. Just as U.S.
maritime hegemony is measured in generations, the threat to that
hegemony will emerge over generations. The apparent lack of utility
of naval forces in secondary campaigns, like Iraq, masks the
fundamentally indispensable role the Navy plays in U.S. national
security.
That does not mean that the Navy as currently
structured is sacrosanct -- far from it. Peer powers will be able to
challenge the U.S. fleet, but not by building their own fleets.
Rather, the construction of effective anti-ship missile systems --
which can destroy merchant ships as well as overwhelm U.S. naval
anti-missile systems -- represents a low-cost challenge to U.S.
naval power. This is particularly true when these anti-ship missiles
are tied to space-based, real-time reconnaissance systems. A major
power such as China need not be able to mirror the U.S. Navy in
order to challenge it.
Whatever happens in Iraq -- or Iran --
the centrality of naval power is unchanging. But the threat to naval
power evolves. The fact that there is no threat to U.S. control of
the sea-lanes at this moment does not mean one will not emerge.
Whether with simple threats like mines or the most sophisticated
anti-ship system, the ability to keep the U.S. Navy from an area or
to close off strategic chokepoints for shipping remains the major
threat to the United States -- which is, first and foremost, a
maritime power.
One of the dangers of wars like those in Iraq
and Afghanistan is that they soak up resources and intellectual
bandwidth. It is said that generals always fight the last war.
Another way of stating that is to say they believe the war they are
fighting now will go on forever in some form. That belief leads to
neglect of capabilities that appear superfluous for the current
conflict. That is the true hollowing-out that extended warfare
creates. It is an intellectual hollowing-out.
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